Washington Postは2011年3月23日付の記事で、東電サイドが津波の危険性を軽視したことを報じている。
Of the seven panel members assigned to study Daiichi, none was a tsunami expert, Azuma [Takashi Azuma, a panel member who studies earthquake fault lines at the National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology] said. From April 2008 through June 2009, the group met 22 times, he said, talking mostly about the earthquake dangers posed by the fault line closest to the plant. The risk of a tsunami “never came up,” Azuma said.
「福島第一原発のパネルメンバー7名には津波の専門家はいなかった2008/4〜2009/6の間に22回の会合があり、発電所に最も近い地震帯による地震の研究が論じられた。しかし、津波については話はなかった」と、産総研で地震帯の研究をしているパネルメンバーのひとりTakeshi Azumaは述べた。
...
The Daiichi panel wrapped up its review and, on June 24, 2009, presented its findings to a larger working group of 40, which included just two tsunami experts. It was there that Okamura [Yukinobu Okamura, a prominent seismologist ], who also works at the science and technology institute, first raised the idea that a tsunami could be as risky as an earthquake.
In A.D. 869, Okamura told the panel, a massive quake struck off the coast of Sendai, in northeastern Japan, sending a tsunami wave more than two miles inland. Only in recent years had a handful of Japan’s tsunami experts concluded that the disaster was more than allegorical, based on evidence collected in geological layers and sediment deposits.
“Research results are out, but there is no mention of that [tsunami] here, and I would like to ask why,” Okamura asked a Tepco official at the meeting, according to a transcript Azuma provided to The Washington Post.
Initially, the Tepco official downplayed the danger, saying that the guidelines for Fukushima had instead factored in a far more recent earthquake, whose magnitude measured 7.9. Okamura pressed on, pointing out that the so-called Jogan earthquake of 869 knocked down a castle.
“As you know, it is a historic earthquake,” the Tepco official said, dismissing its relevance.
福島第一原発パネルは2009年6月24日にレビューを行い、40人構成のワークキンググループに結果を報告した。ここには2名の津波専門家がいた。その一人である著名な地震学者Yukinobu Okamuraは、地震とともに津波もリスキーだと意見を述べた。
Okamuraは「869年に巨大地震が仙台沿岸を襲い、津波は2マイル以上内陸まで到達した」と言う。最近、数名の日本の津波専門家たちが、地層と地震堆積物の証拠から、津波は逸話以上のものだったことを結論した。
Azumaの議事録によれば、「研究結果は出たが、津波には言及はなかった。それで理由を聞いた」とOkamuraは東電に質問した。
最初、東電側は危険性を軽視し、「M7.9という最近の地震に基づいてガイドラインが作られている」と述べた。Okamuraが869年の貞観地震では城が崩れたことを述べると、東電側は「それは歴史的地震だ」と述べて関連を退けた。
[Japanese nuclear plant’s safety analysts brushed off risk of tsunami (2011/03/23) on Washington Post]
また、
Wall Street Journalは2011年3月23日付の記事で、福島第一原発のバックアップ電源がひとつしかない問題を指摘している。
"There has been little to no talk about the need to retrofit existing reactors" with additional safety systems, said Muneo Morokuzu, a former Toshiba Corp. reactor designer who now studies industry policy at the University of Tokyo. "Mostly people thought there was no need to go that far."
「既存原子炉の改善についての話はほとんどなかった。大半の人々はその必要性を考えていなかった」と元東芝の原子炉設計者Muneo Morokuzuは述べた。
Last October, the Nuclear Safety Commission of Japan, one of the nation's two main safety regulators, met to set its long-term agenda. Takanori Tanaka, head of the partly government-supported Nuclear Power Engineering Center, showed the commissioners a PowerPoint slide advocating new technologies that would reduce "residual risk concerning earthquakes and tsunamis," according to documents attached to the meeting minutes.
His presentation focused on improving backup systems for future reactors, as part of a broader pitch to regulators for a new generation of safer plants.
"The Nuclear Safety Commission was just starting a basic discussion of the need to install more diverse safety cooling systems in future reactors," said Mr. Tanaka in a telephone interview Tuesday. A spokesman for the commission declined to comment
「原子力安全委員会は、多様な安全冷却システムを将来の原子炉に装備知る必要性を論じ始めたところだった」とTaknori Tanaaは述べた。
Akira Omoto, a member of a government advisory body helping to tame Fukushima Daiichi, said Friday the quake exposed a "lack of diversity" in emergency cooling mechanisms. The plant's reactors have two to three backup generators each, he said, but the tsunami knocked them out. "The problem was Fukushima Daiichi reactors had only one emergency way to cool their fuel vessels"−either the electrical generators, or in the case of reactor No. 1, the condenser.
多様な緊急冷却メカニズムがなかったことを晒したと政府諮問委員会のAkira Omotoは述べた。
[NORIHIKO SHIROUZU And PETER LANDERS:"Japan Ignored Warning Of Nuclear Vulnerability" (2011/03/23) on Wall Street Journal]
posted by Kumicit at 2011/03/28 08:02
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